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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
ALBERT JAMES GROSSI,

Case No. 20020151-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2002), in
the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, Judge,
presiding.1
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue: Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the police may not
enter a private home and seize items without a search warrant. The exceptions to this rule

1

A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is attached in
Addendum A.

are well-defined and based on considerations of public safety, officer safety, or
homeowner consent. Without any of these justifications, the police entered a home,
searched it, and seized items. Should the court have suppressed this evidence?
Standard of Review: In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress this Court accords
the trial court's legal conclusions no deference, but reviews them for correctness. State v.
Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Factual findings, however, are
accepted by this Court unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Belgard. 840 P.2d 819,
822 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 34-40, 60-71.

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The following constitutional provision is relevant on appeal:
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 29,2000 Appellant Albert James Grossi was charged by
information with four drug-related counts. R. 2-4. He pled not-guilty to the counts, and a
2

preliminary hearing was held. R. 167. The court found that there was probable cause to
believe that Mr. Grossi had committed the crimes, and bound him over for trial. R. 167
[66].
Soon afterwards, the defense counsel filed a motion to suppress evidence of drugs
and drug paraphernalia found in Mr. Grossi's home. R. 34. In support of this, the defense
counsel pointed out that the police did not have a warrant to search Mr. Grossi's home
and had no other justification for either entering it or searching it. R. 67-70. The trial
court disagreed and ruled that the evidence would be allowed. R. 104.
Thereafter, Mr. Grossi pled guilty to Possession of a Controlled Substance on
condition that he could appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 121128. The trial court accepted his plea and sentenced him accordingly. R. 130-33. Mr.
Grossi filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 134-35.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 15,2000 Officers Jason Knight and Perry Beauchaine responded to
a report that a man was assaulting two women in a residential neighborhood. R. 167 [34]. As the Officers approached the scene, a woman identified as Shandra Karren ran
towards them waving her hands. R. 102, 167 [3]. She said that a man had "dragged" her
friend, Andrea Layne, down some stairs into a basement apartment and was assaulting her
there. R. 103,167 [4,18]. Ms. Karren also said that Ms. Layne was six months pregnant.
R. 168 [7].
3

Officer Knight descended the stairs leading to the basement apartment, and
knocked on the door. R. 167 [4]. Mr. Grossi immediately appeared at the door's window.
Id. at 4-5. Officer Knight asked him to open the door. R. 168 [8]. Mr. Grossi refused,
saying that "he didn't want to go to jail." Id. at 9. Officer Knight said he needed to check
the welfare of the woman inside. IcL Mr. Grossi said that she wasfine,and he yelled for
"her to tell [Officer Knight] that she's okay." Id at 10. However, Officer Knight did not
hear her answer. R. 167 [5]. Officer Knight continued to ask Mr. Grossi to open the door,
and he continued to refuse. R. 168 [10]. This type of exchange continued for about ten
minutes. R. 167 [5]. At one point, Mr. Grossi told Officer Knight that the woman "was
going out a cellar door." R. 168 [10]. Officer Knight heard "yelling and commotion" from
"around the back," but he did not know what it was about. R. 167 [5]. Eventually, Officer
Knight said that he "wasn't going to go away" until he "found out what had happened and
if the female was okay." R. 167 [5]. Officer Knight also said that he needed to search Mr.
Grossi for weapons. Id. Finally, Mr. Grossi came out, leaving the door slightly ajar
behind him.2
Officer Knight grabbed Mr. Grossi's hands behind his back and did a pat-down
search for weapons. R. 168 [11]. About this time, Officer Beauchaine joined Officer
Knight, and they handcuffed Mr. Grossi and arrested him "[f]or interfering and not
coming out, delaying [the] investigation." R. 167 [7]. They did not give him a Miranda

2

Officer Knight testified that the door "was cracked. . . . it was shut a little bit.... it
wasn't like wide open but it wasn't shut all the way, no." R. 167 [6].
4

warning. R. 168 [35]. Nor did they search his apartment at that time. Id. They simply took
him up the stairs to the patrol car. R. 167 [26], R. 168 [14]. Officer Lyman Guest had
arrived on the scene in response to their call for help, and he took charge of Mr. Grossi.
R. 168 [14].
After leaving Mr. Grossi in Officer Guest's charge, Officer Knight spoke with
Officer Beauchaine, Ms. Karren and another witness named Shawn. R. 167, [8,17], 168
[14]. Shawn said that, before the officers had arrived, there had been a heated exchange
between Mr. Grossi, Ms. Karren, and Ms. Layne. R. 167 [8]. However, there had been no
physical violence. Id, Conversely, Ms. Karren maintained that Mr. Grossi had pushed Ms.
Layne toward the apartment. R. 167 [17-18].
About this time Officer Beauchaine told Officer Knight that Ms. Layne had come
out the side door of the apartment and had run away while he had been speaking with Mr.
Grossi. R. 168 [15].
With the alleged victim long gone, the officers gathered around the patrol car to
consider their next course of action. R. 167 [8]. They considered looking for Ms. Layne.
Id. However, in the end they decided simply to transport Mr. Grossi to jail. R. 167 [8],
168 [16]. Mr. Grossi was unhappy about going to jail and was worried about leaving his
apartment unlocked. R. 167 [8], 168 [16]. A neighbor who was standing nearby said that
Mr. Grossi asked the police to "[l]et me lock my door. Someone might take my stuff." R.
168 [60]. An officer had replied, "We'll take care of it." Mr. Grossi had responded, "No,

5

let me take care of it
Nevertheless, Officer Knight decided to secure the apartment himself. R. 167 [9].
He went down to the apartment door and tried to lock it, but found that it could not be
locked without a key. Id. He returned to the patrol car and asked Mr. Grossi for the key,
but he didn't have it. Id. He said that he thought Ms. Layne had the key. Id. Officer
Knight again went to the apartment. Id. He looked inside the apartment and saw that it
was dark and cluttered. R. 167 [10]. He also saw a lamp broken on the living room floor.
Id. Just then, Ms. Karren came out of the bedroom. Id. at 11. This startled Officer Knight,
and he asked her what she was doing there. Id. She explained that she had slept there the
night before and had come back to get her coat.4 Officer Knight testified that she seemed
nervous and that her presence in the apartment made him nervous. R. 167 [11]. He
decided to do a pat down search of her, but he found no weapons. I d
At this point, Officer Knight decided to do a "security check" of the apartment. R.
168 [17]. He testified that he did this for safety reasons:
any time that we're in a situation where we feel like we could be in danger
when we're out in the living room and we don't know what's doing on, we
just do a visual search and make sure there is no one else in the apartment
that can come out and injure us.
IdL at 12. However, he also testified that he had heard no sounds and had seen no shadows

3

Id. at 60-61. Officer Knight's testimony was more vague. He testified that Mr. Grossi
"stated that he wanted his house secured." R. 167 [27]. Officer Beauchaine testified that he
recalled "hearing Mr. Grossi express concern about the apartment and whether it would be
secured sufficiently or properly." Id. at 56.
4

It was a cool November evening. R. 167 [2,11].
6

or movements. Id. at 34. Only Ms. Karren's unexpected appearance and her nervousness
prompted the search. Id. at 35.
Using a flashlight, Officer Knight went into the bedroom and found "multiple drug
type items out in plain view." R. 167 [12]. There was a baggie containing a white powder,
bottles, marijuana, a yellow crystal-like substance, and scales. Id. Officer Knight called
Officer Beauchaine down, and they seized these items. Id at 13. Then they transported
Mr. Grossi to jail, and he was charged with four drug-related crimes. R. 2-4.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The State did not meet its heavy burden of showing that Officer Knight's search of
Mr. Grossi's home was justified even though Officer Knight did not have an appropriate
search warrant. As a general rule, the police must obtain a search warrant before
searching a home. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969). There are exceptions
to this rule, but they are "jealously and carefully drawn," and must be stringently applied.
United States v. Aquino. 836 F.2d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1988). Because of this, the
State's burden is particularly heavy. United States v. Anderson. 981 F.2d 1560,1567 (10th
Cir. 1992). And it was not met here.
This argument analyzes the facts of this case under four exceptions to the warrant
requirement rule.5 Those exceptions are: "protective sweeps" conducted during in-home

5

There are other exceptions, but they are wholly unrelated to the circumstances of this
case and will not be explored. Exceptions not explored are set out in footnote fifteen.
7

arrests;6 consent by the homeowner;7 items in "plain view" of the officer;8 and
emergencies.9
First, the search of Mr. Grossi's apartment cannot be justified under the
"protective sweep" exception because Mr. Grossi was not arrested in his home; he was
arrested outside. And, as the case law holds, protective sweeps may be conducted only
during in-home arrests. Buie, 494 U.S. at 337. Further, the alleged victim in this case, Ms.
Layne, had left the apartment and run away. R. 168 [15]. So there was no practical reason
for Officer Knight to search the apartment for her. What is more, there are no facts here to
show that an unknown person inside posed a danger to those on the arrest scene. This is a
crucial requirement of protective sweeps, and without some pertinent showing, the sweep
cannot be justified. Buie, 494 U.S. at 334.
Second, the consent exception does not apply because Mr. Grossi did not consent
to Officer Knight's search. In fact, the most that the record shows is that he expressed
concern about leaving his apartment unlocked. R. 103. This is a far cry from the
"unequivocal and specific" consent required under the case law. United States v. Iribe. 11
F.3d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993). And it does not show that the consent was "freely and
voluntarily given." Bumper. 391 U.S. at 548. The State had the burden of proving both of

6

Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990).

7

Bumper v. North Carolina. 391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968).

8

State v. Romero. 660 P.2d 715, 718 (1983).

9

United States v. Bute. 43 F.3d 531. 539 (10th Cir. 1994).
8

these things, and it did not meet that burden.
Third, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply because the State did not show that
Officer Knight was lawfully in Mr. Grossi's bedroom when he seized the items that were
in "plain view" there. Romero. 660 P.2d at 718. Lawful presence in the area where items
are seized is a crucial element of the "plain view" exception, Id,, and it was not met here.
Finally, Officer Knight's search is not valid under the emergency, or "exigent
circumstances" doctrine because there is no indication that Ms. Layne, or anyone else,
was in immediate need of assistance at the time of the search. Without an immediate
need, the emergency doctrine may be invoked. Bute, 43 F.3d at 539.
In short, Officer Knight's search of Mr. Grossi's apartment and the seizure of
items he found there violated the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. And so, the items he seized cannot be used against Mr. Grossi at
trial, and the trial court's denial of Mr. Grossi's motion to sever was erroneous.

ARGUMENT
THE POLICE DID NOT HAVE A WARRANT OR ANY OTHER LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION FOR SEARCHING MR, GROSSI'S HOME
Nothing about this case shows that the police were justified in searching Mr.
Grossi's home and seizing items that they found. They did not have a search warrant or
Mr. Grossi's permission to enter his home. The alleged victim had run away and so there
was no need to search for her. Mr. Grossi had been arrested outside and so there was no

9

need to search for him. Indeed, the only reason given for Officer Knight's decision to
enter the home is Mr. Grossi's concern about leaving his door unlocked while the police
transported him to jail. R. 167 [26-27]. However, his concern did not give the officers the
right to enter his apartment, or to search it. In fact, this is such a thin justification for a
search that it forcefully brings to mind the United States Supreme Court's warning that
arresting a man does not give the police the right to "rummage at will among his papers in
search of whatever will convict him . . . . " Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 767
(1969). The police cannot be so zealous in their duty that they forget the constitutional
limitations on their authority.
The limitation at issue here is set forth in the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment absolutely forbids unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend.
IV. Furthermore, the reasonableness of a search and seizure is not an amorphous
abstraction that varies with each case. There are well-defined rules that guide the
evaluation of searches and seizures. And they must be strictly applied.
Significantly, police must, whenever practicable, obtain a search warrant to search
a home. ChimeL 395 U.S. at 758. This is not an empty formality. On the contrary, it is the
substance of the Fourth Amendment itself. As the United States Supreme Court has
explained, the decision of whether to invade the privacy of a home should be left to an
objective magistrate rather than to the police, who are biased because their purpose is to
detect crime and arrest criminals:
10

The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was not done to shield criminals nor to make the
home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective
mind might weigh the need to invade the privacy in order to enforce the
law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the
discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of
criminals.10
The wisdom of the warrant requirement has been proven through years of
application and experience. Id. And now, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable
unless the circumstances fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). These exceptions include:
protective sweeps incident to an arrest,11 consent of the homeowner,12 items in plain view
during a lawful intrusion,13 and emergencies.14 The lines defining these exceptions are
"jealously and carefully drawn," and must be stringently applied. United States v.
Aquino, 836 R2d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1988).
In this case, the police did not have a warrant to enter and search Mr. Grossi's

10

Id at 761. See also Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10,14 (1948) (Crime, even in
the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of course, of grave concern to society, and the law allows
such crime to be reached on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a
home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell
in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or
Government enforcement agent.")
11

Chime!, 395 U.S. at 763.

12

State v. Kellev. 718 P.2d 385, 389 (Utah 1986).

13

State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1983).

14

United States v. Bute. 43 F.3d 531, 539 (10th Cir. 1994).
11

home. R. 102-04. And so, the search may be justified only if it falls into one of the
exceptions described above.15 And, as an analysis shows, none of the exceptions apply.
The four subsections below apply the facts of this case to the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. Subsection A shows that the police were not justified in conducting
a protective sweep of Mr. Grossi's home. Subsection B shows that the police did not have
Mr. Grossi consent to enter or search his home. Subsection C shows that the seizure of
items was not justified under the "plain view" doctrine. Finally, Subsection D shows that
there was no threat, emergency, or danger that justified the police officers' entry into Mr.
Grossi's home.

A, The "Protective Sweep" Doctrine does not Justify the Search of Mr,
Grossi's Home
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Officer Knight was justified in
conducting a protective sweep of Mr. Grossi's apartment because Ms. Karren startled him
by emerging from the bedroom while he was trying to lock the apartment's door. R. 8889, 104. The trial court indicated that Ms. Karren's "nervous demeanor and the possibility

15

There are a few other exceptions to the warrant requirement rule, such as the "hot
pursuit" exception in which the police are justified in entering a private domain to complete an
arrest. Brown, 853 P.2d at 855. There is also the "open view" exception in which the police are
justified in seizing items in public areas. Id. Some jurisdictions even allow an exception when
there is imminent danger of the loss or destruction of evidence. United States v. Anderson. 981
F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992).
However, in this case none of the exceptions apply and so they are no explored and
applied to the facts.
12

that others might be present in the apartment," justified Officer's Knight's decision to
conduct the sweep. R. 89. The court also noted that the victim could have come back to
the apartment, that she may have been injured or in need of help. IcL Therefore, the court
concluded, "Officer Knight's decision to conduct a 'protective sweep' of the apartment []
became an appropriate and necessary security measure

"Id.

The trial court's holding is incorrect from every standpoint of the "protective
sweep" case law as it has developed under United States Supreme Court decisions. To
begin with, a protective sweep of a home is conducted only when a suspect is arrested
inside of his home; if he is arrested outside the home or at some other location, the home
may not be entered unless there is some other basis for the intrusion.16 This is because
protective sweeps are justified only by the possibility of danger from unknown persons
inside the home where officers are making an arrest. This danger, as the United States
Supreme Court has explained, is why officers may make a temporary deviation from the
right of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment:
the arresting officers are permitted [while making an in-home arrest] to take
reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest.
That interest is sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may
entail.

16

See Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) ("The Fourth Amendment permits a
properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching
officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be
swep harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."); Chimel, 395 U.S. at
763 ('There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's person and the area
'within his immediate control' - construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.")
13

Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. And so, if the officers aren't arresting a suspect at home, there is
no danger from persons in the home and a protective sweep is not justified.
Furthermore, a protective sweep is not automatically justified even if the suspect is
arrested at home. Two other conditions must be met. First, a protective sweep may be
conducted only if there are articulable facts that, "taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that
the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."
Id. Second, the sweep may not be a "full search of the premise," it is only "a cursory
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found." Id. at 335.
In this case, Officer's Knight's protective sweep was illegal for several reasons.
Most significantly, Mr. Grossi was not even arrested inside his home. He was arrested
outside. R. 168 [12-13]. And, he did not open his door and invite the police in. He
stepped outside and closed his door almost all the way. R. 168 [12-13]. Because of this,
the protective sweep was illegal and no further analysis is necessary.
But even if the analysis continues, the propriety of the sweep does not improve.
This is because there were no articulable facts that would warrant a reasonable suspicion
that Mr. Grossi's home harbored persons dangerous to those on the arrest scene. The
arrest scene, by the time Officer Knight entered the apartment and conducted the sweep,
had moved from the area outside Mr. Grossi's apartment to the street, where Officer
Knight's and Officer Guest's patrol cars were parked. R. 167 [26-27]. Officer
Beauchaine, Officer Guest, and Mr. Grossi were all gathered there. Id There is nothing to
14

show that these people were in any danger from someone in the apartment.
Further, there is nothing to show that Officer Knight himself, who had come back
to the apartment to lock the door, was in any danger. And if he felt that he was, he could
have simply withdrawn. Earlier, he had made this very choice. When he was speaking to
Mr. Grossi through his door window, Officer Knight did not go in because of his
trepidation about what he would encounter in the apartment. R. 167 [23]. This shows that
Officer Knight knew he had no obligation to enter the apartment if he felt he was danger.
And an obligation to enter did not arise after Mr. Grossi was arrested.
Certainly, he was under no obligation to lock Mr. Grossi's door; in fact, a neighbor
overhearing the scene testified that Mr. Grossi did not want Officer Knight to lock it. R.
168 [60]. Mr. Grossi wanted to lock it himself. IdL This casts grave doubt on Officer
Knight's right to be in the apartment at all. Regardless of that, however, if Officer Knight
felt he was in danger inside the apartment, he was under no obligation to stay. The arrest
had been completed and Mr. Grossi was handcuffed in Officer Guest's car, R. 168 [12],
the witnesses had been interviewed, Id. at 14-16, and the alleged victim was long gone.17

17

R. 167 [53], 168 [15]. The trial court rested its justification of the protective sweep
largely on its factual finding that Officer Knight had wished to search for the alleged victim. R.
103. However, this finding is not supported by the record. During the preliminary hearing,
Officer Knight testified that his sole reason for conducting the sweep was the unexpected
appearance of Ms. Karren from the bedroom and her nervousness. R. 167 [11-12, 32-34]. And
his written reports reflect this. R. 168 [24-25].
The evidence, fully marshaled to support the trial court's finding, consists of only one
thing: Officer Knight's sole statement at the suppression hearing that he thought the alleged
victim may have returned. R. 168 [24-25]. This, however, is an afterthought on the part of
Officer Knight and it does not reflect his true reasoning at the time of the sweep.
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There was no reason for Officer Knight to have stayed.
Several cases are directly on point. In Brown v. State the Wyoming Supreme Court
held that the police had conducted an unlawful protective sweep while serving a "lady in
pajamas" with a two-year-old arrest warrant for a traffic citation. Brown v. State, 738
P.2d 1092, 1093 (Wyo. 1987). The police had attempted to serve the lady on her front
porch. Id. However, she had turned and walked into her mobile home. Id at 1093-94.
They followed her inside and discovered an empty knife sheath on the floor. I d at 1094.
On this basis, the police decided to conduct a protective sweep. Id, In doing so,
discovered marijuana. Id.
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that this was unlawful because the lady had
been arrested on her front porch and there was nothing to show that a sweep of the home

The record shows this. Testimony by all of the police officers, including Officer Knight,
shows that the victim was long gone by the time Officer Knight conducted his search. Officer
Beauchaine had seen her jump over a fence and run away during the time Officer Knight was
speaking with Mr. Grossi through the door. R. 167 [53]. And, Officer Knight learned about this
immediately after arresting Mr. Grossi, and before going down to lock the apartment. R. 167, [8,
17], 168 [14]. In fact, Officer Knight himself testified several times that he knew the alleged
victim was gone. R. 167 [16, 27], 168 [15]. And so, there is no basis for the trial court's finding
that Officer Knight's wish to search for the victim supported his decision to do a protective
sweep.
Further, even if Officer Knight was truly concerned about the victim, this does not justify
a protective sweep. Protective sweeps are conducted to dispel threats to those on the arrest scene.
They are not justified by any other reason. Buie, 494 U.S. at 337.
To be sure, nobody denies that searching for a possibly injured victim does not justify a
search. However, this type of search falls under a different exception to the warrant-requirement
rule and must be analyzed accordingly. This analysis is found in Subsection D: "There was no
Emergency, Danger, or Threat that Justified the Police Officer's Entry into Mr. Grossi's Home."
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was necessary:
appellant was arrested outside her home, and we can find nothing in the
record to support a reasonable belief that there might be other persons
inside appellant's home who posed a threat to the officers' safety.
Id. at 1095. The Court also noted that the State in that case had not even established the
validity of the arrest, and that the circumstances did not show that there was a reasonable,
articulable threat of danger:
If we were to uphold the search conducted in this case on the record before
us, we would open the door to the possibility of warrantless general
searches of the homes of every citizen ever given a traffic citation. Law
enforcement officers may not use the pretext of an arrest on a minor charge
as a means to engage in an overbroad search to uncover evidence of an
unrelated offense.
Id at 1096-97.
Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court denounced a protective sweep of a man's
home after he was arrested outside. Hayes v. State. 797 P.2d 962, 971 (Nev. 1990). In that
case, the man called out "Dawn" two or three times as he was arrested. Id at 964. On this
basis, the police entered his home and conducted a protective search, finding narcotics
and paraphernalia in "plain view." Id. at 963. They also found the man's wife, Dawn
Richmond, in the back bedroom. Id at 964.
According to the testimony, there had been some concern by the police officers
that the arrestee was calling to Don Cisco, a felon who had been recently released from
jail. Id at 964. However, the evidence also showed that the police knew the arrestee's
wife was named "Dawn," and that she lived in the home. Id
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After examining the general guidelines governing protective searches, the Nevada
Supreme Court held that there was no reasonable, articulable belief of danger in this case.
Id. at 967. Like the Wyoming Supreme Court, this Court expressed concern that without
such a belief, discemable from typical circumstances, the Fourth Amendment protections
would be practically a nullity:
the police would have carte blanch power to conduct sweep searches of
citizens' homes incident to virtually any arrest for a felony, whether violent
or not, even where the arrestee surrenders at the front door; by means of
post-hoc rationalizations, the police could justify virtually any sweep
search.... We further believe that this is why, in Buie, the [United States]
Supreme Court affirmed the requirement that officers' perception of danger
be based on some specific and articulable grounds.
Id
The Court also approved the idea that police officers, once they carry out their
duty of arrest, should withdraw if their forebodings of danger are based on hunches or
general anxiety:
absent greater indication of danger than was present in this case, it appears
that it would have been far safer for the six armed police officers simply to
withdraw after [the arrestee] was in safe custody, instead of proceeding
through each room of the resident and risk confrontation with others who
might be present.
Id. And, the Court held that third persons inside a home do not justify a sweep unless
there is some indication that they are dangerous. However, "[i]f officers have no
reasonable basis to fear danger from third persons," they are constitutionally required to
withdraw. Id,
Cases from the Tenth Circuit are in accord. One case like this is State v. Anderson.
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where the Tenth Circuit held that government agents were not justified in returning to a
defendant's house to conduct a protective sweep after arresting the defendant some
distance away in his vehicle. Anderson, 981 F.2d at 1562-63, 1568. In that case, the
government tried to justify the sweep on the basis that the agents were worried that those
in the house would become suspicious and destroy evidence. IdL at 1563. The Tenth
Circuit, noting that exceptions to the warrant requirement must be "jealously and
carefully drawn," held that this search could not be justified under the "protective sweep"
doctrine. Id at 1567. There was no danger to officers, and the danger that evidence would
be involved a different analysis, which incidently, was also not met. Id at 1567-68.
Another Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Baca, involved the illegal sweep of a
defendant's home after he had been arrested for a parole violation. In that case, unlike
those explored above, the defendant actually was arrested inside of his home, as required
by the "protective sweep" cases. United States v. Baca, 417 F.2d 103,104 (10th Cir.
1969). However, the Tenth Circuit held there was nothing to justify a sweep of his entire
house, and that the drugs and paraphernalia found was the fruit of an illegal search and
seizure:
The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by
the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault
an officer or effect an escape, or as well as by the need to prevent the
destruction of evidence of the crime - things which might easily happen
where the weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his
immediate control. But these justifications are absent where a search is
remote in time or place from the arrest.
LI at 105.
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The principals set out in the cases above show that the protective sweep conducted
by Officer Knight in this case was not justified. As shown in Brown and Hayes, arresting
a suspect outside of his front door is not enough to justify a sweep of the house. And that
is precisely what happened here. Mr. Grossi was arrested outside of his house, and almost
immediately taken to the patrol car.
Also, as shown in all four cases explored above, there must be some specific
indicia of danger; something atypical. Otherwise, any arrest would be a justification for a
sweep and people's homes would be secure only if they were not at home.18 In this case
there is nothing to show that there were specific indicia of danger or even that the
circumstances were atypical. The most that the record shows is that Officer Knight was
startled when Ms. Karren emerged from the bedroom. R. 167 [11-12]. However, this is
not enough. Ms. Karren was not unknown to Officer Knight; he had already spoken with
her several times. R. 167 [3-4], 168 [14]. He did not know her to be a dangerous person.
Id. Further, he even knew that she was staying in the apartment. R. 167 [30]. And so,
even if her presence startled him and gave him foreboding, his proper course of action
should have been to withdraw, as instructed by the courts in Hayes and Anderson. Her
emergence from the bedroom did not amount to a reasonable, articulable indication of
danger.

18

See Chimel 395 U.S. at 767. ("True, by hypothesis the power [to search] would not
exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the premises; but it is small consolation to
know that one's papers are safe only so long as one is not at home.")
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In sum, Officer Knight was not justified in entering Mr. Grossi's home or
conducting a sweep. His actions were unconstitutional, and any items he discovered
during the course of this activity should have been suppressed by the trial court.

B. The Police did not Have Mr, Grossi's Consent to Enter his Home
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Mr. Grossi essentially consented
to Officer Knight's entry into the apartment by expressing concern about leaving the
apartment unlocked. R. 104. This conclusion was based upon several testimonies which
have some slight, but significant, variation. One of the testimonies was that of a neighbor
who overheard the conversation between Mr. Grossi and the police. According to the
neighbor, Mr. Grossi asked the police to "[l]et me lock my door. Someone might take my
stuff." R. 168 [60]. An officer had replied, "Well take care of it." Mr. Grossi had
responded, "No, let me take care of it

" Id. at 60-61. Officer Knight also testified

about the conversation, but his testimony was more vague. He testified that Mr. Grossi
"stated that he wanted his house secured." R. 167 [27]. Then, Officer Beauchaine testified
that he recalled "hearing Mr. Grossi express concern about the apartment and whether it
would be secured sufficiently or properly." Id. at 56. In the end, the trial court found that
Mr. Grossi "said that he wanted his apartment locked up and secured," and that "Officer
Knight went back to the apartment to lock the door because the defendant was in
custody." R. 103. On this basis, the trial court concluded Mr. Grossi had consented as a
matter of law. R. 104.
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However, regardless of the trial court's factual findings, its legal conclusion that
Mr. Grossi consented to the intrusion is not sustainable. This is because neither the
neighbor, Officer Knight, nor Officer Beauchaine testified to any facts that meet the legal
standards required for consent. This is demonstrated by an examination of the case law.
The case law shows that the chief rule of consent is that, "[w]hen a prosecutor
seeks to rely upon consent to justify the lawfulness of a search, he has the burden of
proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given." Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968). Several cases are helpful in understanding this. One
of the most helpful is the leading United States Supreme Court opinion, Bumper v. North
Carolina. In that case, the police gained entrance to a home by claiming to have a search
warrant when, in fact, the warrant was faulty. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 546-49. The Court
held that, in such circumstances, consent is not given. The Court reasoned that an
officer's announcement that he has a search warrant does not give rise to consent, only
acquiescence to a claim of authority:
When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a
warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. The situation is instinct with coercion - albeit colorably lawful
coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.
Id at 550.
Another case where voluntary consent was not shown was the Tenth Circuit case
of United States v. Salinas-Cano. In that case, law enforcement agents wanted to search
the belongings of the defendant, who they suspected of being a drug dealer. United States
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v. Salinas-Cano. 959 F.2d 861, 862 (10th Cir. 1992). They knew that the defendant spent
several nights per week at his girlfriend's home. Id They went to her home, obtained her
consent to search her home, and searched it. Id They found the defendant's suitcase with
incriminating evidence inside, and seized it. Id. In these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit
held that the search was unconstitutional. Id at 866. After first noting that the government
has the burden of proving consent, the Tenth Circuit held that ambiguous situations must
be clarified by law enforcement before they proceed with a searched:
The burden [of showing consent] cannot be met if agents, faced with an
ambiguous situation, nevertheless proceed without making further inquiry.
If the agents do not learn enough, if the circumstances make it unclear
whether the property about to be searched is subject to "mutual use" by the
person giving consent, "then warrantless entry is unlawful without further
inquiry."
Id. at 864 (emphasis and citations omitted).
And again, in United States v. Iribe. the Tenth Circuit held that consent was not
given where it was unclear whether a Spanish-speaking property owner had given her
consent to a search. United States v. Iribe. 11 F.3d 1553, 1558-59 (10th Cir. 1993). In that
case, the police stopped the defendant in his car pursuant to a federal arrest warrant. Id. at
1555. After the arrest, they went to the residence where they suspected he lived, and
knocked on the door. Id. A young woman who spoke only Spanish answered the door. Id.
One of the officers spoke Spanish, and he testified that she consented to the search. She
also signed a consent form, written in English, which the officer had verbally translated
for her. Id. The search of the house and the detached garage yielded substantial evidence
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against the defendant. Id at 1556.
The Tenth Circuit examined the situation closely and held that consent was not
given. In so holding, the Court emphasized that consent must be "unequivocal and
specific," as well as "freely and intelligently given." Id at 1557. If it is not, the search
cannot be considered valid. Id, The Court also noted that "[t]he voluntariness of consent
must be determined from the totality of the circumstances," Id., and that where the
circumstances appear to overbear the property owner's choice, consent cannot be found.
On the other hand, consent was shown in the Utah Supreme Court case of State v.
Kelley. In that case, an officer arrived at the defendant's door after following footprints in
the snow from the scene of a homicide to the defendant's house. Kelley, 718 P.2d at 389.
The defendant, who was in his underwear, allowed the officer in and the officer saw a
distinctive item of evidence in plain view. Id. The officer then followed the defendant
into his bedroom, where the defendant wished to dress, and found more items of
evidence. Id The Court held that, in that case, the defendant consented to the officer's
entry into his home and so his expectation of privacy was "substantially reduced." Id.
And, after the officer saw evidence in plain view, the officer was justified in following
the defendant into the bedroom to ensure that the defendant did not try any acts of
evasion or harm. Id,
In this case, the facts are much more similar to those where consent was not found
than to State v. Kelley above. Here, Mr. Grossi merely stated that he wanted to lock his
door, R. 168 [60-61], or that he wanted it locked. R. 167 [27, 56]. This is, at the very best,
24

was ambiguous with regard to consent. Certainly, it is not the clear, unequivocal consent
specifically required under Salinas-Cano and Iribe. And in fact, if the totality of
circumstances is regarded as required by Iribe. it must be concluded that Mr. Grossi did
not give his consent to Officer Knight's entry. Mr. Grossi had already shown that he did
not want the officers in his apartment by refusing to allow them entry when they first
arrived, R. 167 [4-5], and by closing the door when he finally came out after Officer
Knight's repeated requests. WL at 6. In these circumstances, the fact that he wanted his
door locked after he was arrested cannot support Officer Knight's decision to enter Mr.
Grossi's apartment.

C. The "Plain View" Doctrine Does not Justify the Search
The trial court also cites the "plain view" doctrine as justification for Officer
Knight's search and seizure of items in Mr. Grossi's home.19 However, the plain view
doctrine does not apply. This is because the requirements for application of the doctrine
are not met. These requirements are:
(1) the officer is lawfully present where the search and seizure occur; (2)
the evidence is in plain view; and (3) the evidence is clearly incriminating.20

19

R. 85,104. Notably, the plain view doctrine is different from the "open view" doctrine.
The plain view doctrine applies it evidence legally found inside of a private domicile or
business, Romero. 660 P.2d at 718. On the other hand, the "open view" doctrine allows the
police to gather any evidence that it finds in a public area, or viewable from a public area. State
v. Belgard. 840 P.2d 819, 823 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
20

Romero. 660 P.2d at 718. See also State v. McArthun 2000 UT App 23, ^[22, 996 P.2d

555.
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The first requirement, which is that the officer must be lawfully present, is not met
because Officer Knight was not lawfully present in Mr. Grossi's apartment.21 Mr. Grossi
had closed the door behind him when he had emerged from his apartment at Officer
Knight's request, R. 167 [6], and Officer Knight had no further business at the apartment
after taking Mr. Grossi up to Officer Guest's patrol car. The victim had run off, R. 168
[15], the witnesses had been interviewed, and there was no further reason to stay in the
vicinity. And, as shown in the previous subsection, Mr. Grossi's concern about leaving
his apartment unlocked did not give Officer Knight the legal right to enter the apartment.
And so, his very presence in the entryway was illegal and anything that was in "plain
view" could not have been legally seized.
Importantly, even if Mr. Grossi's concern about leaving his apartment unlocked
constituted clear, unequivocal consent for Officer Knight to be in the doorway, he was not
justified in going any further. Certainly, he was not justified in going into the back
bedroom. The case law specifically holds that it is fundamental that an officer may not
exceed the scope of his invitation into a private home:
If he or she is invited onto private property, a government agent "does not
need probable cause nor warrant to enter so long as he does not exceed the
scope of his invitation." . . . "Once inside the house, [an agent may not]
exceed the scope of his invitation by ransacking the house generally, but he
may seize anything in plain view."
McArthur. 2000 UT App 23, ^[23. And so, even if Officer Knight was lawfully in Mr.

21

Because the first requirement is not met, it is irrelevant whether the other requirements
are met and so analysis is not provided.
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Grossi's doorway, he was not justified in entering any further. The very most that could
be implied from the ambiguous conversation about Mr. Grossi's unlocked front door is
that Officer Knight could lock the door. That is all. And because no incriminating
evidence was in plain view from the doorway, R. 167 [10-12], none of the evidence
gathered from Mr. Grossi's apartment may be admitted at trial under the plain view
doctrine.

D. There was no Emergency. Danger, or Threat that Justified the Police
Officer's Entry into Mr, Grossi's Home
Although the trial court did not specifically rely on the theory that an emergency,
danger, or threat justified Officer Knight's intrusion into Mr. Grossi's home, the court did
refer to the possibility that the alleged victim may have returned. R. 87. The court also
referred to the possibility that she may have been injured. Id. Because of these references,
an analysis of the emergency, or "exigent circumstances" doctrine is appropriate in this
appeal.
Under the exigent circumstances doctrine courts recognize that certain
circumstances justify the warrantless entry of police or rescue workers into a private
dwelling:
the protection of property may constitute an exigency sufficient to permit
police to 'enter premises without warrants for such emergency purposes as
aiding in fire-fighting, giving first aid to people in distress, protecting
persons or property from threatened harm, and the like.
Bute. 43 F.3d at 539. To invoke this doctrine, the person who entered the private dwelling
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"must have had an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency existed that required
immediate entry to render assistance or prevent harm to persons or property within."22
In this case, Officer Knight had no "objectively reasonable belief that an
emergency existed in Mr. Grossi's apartment or his bedroom. Nobody cried out from the
apartment or bedroom, no noises were heard, and after Mr. Grossi was arrested nobody
claimed that any emergency was going on inside. Nevertheless, the trial court found that
Officer's Knight's entry was justified, in part, on his desire to check on the welfare of the
alleged victim. R. 103-04. But not only are the factual aspects of this finding
unsupported, the legal conclusion that this justified entry is incorrect.
First of all, the record does not support the trial court's finding that Officer Knight
entered the bedroom because of his concern for the victim. During the preliminary
hearing, Officer Knight testified that his sole reason for conducting the sweep was the
unexpected appearance of Ms. Karren from the bedroom and her nervousness. R. 167
[11-12, 32-34]. And, his written reports support this. R. 168 [24-25].
What is more, the evidence, fully marshaled to support the trial court's finding,
consists only of the following: Officer Knight's sole statement at the suppression hearing
that the alleged victim may have returned to the apartment. R. 168 [17]. However, this
statement was an afterthought and it does not reflect Officer Knight's true thoughts at the
time of the sweep. The record proves this. Officer Beauchaine had seen Ms. Layne
emerge from the apartment, jump over a fence, and run away during the time Officer
22

Id. See also. State v. Davis. 666 P.2d 802, 809 (Or. 1983).
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Knight was speaking with Mr. Grossi through the door. R. 167 [53]. And, Officer
Beauchaine told Officer Knight this after Mr. Grossi was arrested. R. 167, [8,17], 168
[14]. In fact, Officer Knight himself testified several times that he knew the alleged
victim was gone. R. 167 [16, 27], 168 [15].
Furthermore, the fact that Ms. Karren returned to the apartment does support any
inference that Ms. Layne had returned. Officer Knight had just finished speaking with
Ms. Karren a few minutes earlier and knew that she was in the vicinity. R. 168 [14]. He
also knew that she had been staying in the apartment. R. 167 [30]. Conversely, he knew
that Ms. Layne was gone. R. 167 [16, 27], 168 [15]. In light of all of this evidence, and
reasonable inferences from the record, the trial court's finding that Officer Knight
conducted a security sweep in part to check on the alleged victim is clearly erroneous.
Second, regardless of the accuracy of the factual finding, the trial court's
conclusion that Officer Knight's concern for the victim justified entry into Mr. Grossi's
apartment is legally incorrect. R. 104. This is because there is nothing to show that an
"emergency existed that required immediate entry to render assistance" to Ms. Layne.
Bute. 43 F.3d at 539. Even if Officer Knight truly thought that Ms. Layne had returned,
he did not testify that he thought she was injured or otherwise in need of help. In fact, this
would have been unlikely considering that she had just jumped a fence and run off down
the street. R. 167 [53]. And, Officer Knight did not see or hear anything from the
bedroom to indicate that she was in need of help. R. 168 [17-18].
The Oregon case of State v. Davis is directly on point. In that case, police were
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called to a motel where a fight was allegedly in progress. Davis. 666 P.2d at 804. When
they arrived were was no fight, but a man approached and said that his girlfriend "might
be being raped in room number nine by a man he had seen with an automatic pistol in his
waistband." Id The police drew their guns, knocked on the door, and announced their
presence. Id Shortly afterwards, a woman opened the door and walked out. Id. She was
fully clothed and did not appear disheveled or frightened. Id She walked passed the
officers without being questioned. Id Then, through a crack in the door the officers saw
the defendant. Id They ordered him out of the room and he complied. Id
Then the officers entered the motel room. Id The defendant said that he didn't
want them in his room, but they searched it anyway. Id. Nobody searched the defendant
or asked about the woman. Id. In the end, the officers found a gun and drugs, and the
defendant was arrested. Id
The Oregon Supreme Court held that, under the exigent circumstances doctrine,
the officers had every right to approach the motel door and investigate. Id. at 810.
However, when the woman calmly exited the room and walked away without any sign of
victimization, the emergency dissipated. Id. After that, the officer's entry into the motel
room could not be justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine.
The circumstances of this case are remarkably similar. The police were called to
the scene and had the right to knock on the Mr. Grossi's door, and perhaps even enter if
Ms. Layne was being beaten or injured inside. However, that is not what occurred.
Instead, Mr. Grossi emerged at Officer Knight's request and was arrested. R. 167 [5-7].
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And then, before Officer Knight entered the apartment, he was informed by Officer
Beauchaine that Ms. Layne had emerged from the cellar door and had run away. R. 168
[15]. At that point, any right that the police had to enter under the exigent circumstances
doctrine receded.
In short, Officer Knight's entry into Mr. Grossi's apartment cannot be justified
under the exigent circumstances doctrine because there is no indication that Ms. Layne
was in the apartment or that she needed immediate assistance. And so, the warrantless
entry was unconstitutional and its fruits should have been suppressed by the trial court.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Grossi requests that this Court reverse Mr. Grossi's
conviction and remand this case with instructions to suppress the evidence that resulted
from the police officers' unconstitutional search and seizure.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
NOTICE

vs.

Case No: 001919867 FS

ALBERT JAMES GROSSI,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

LESLIE A. LEWIS
February 1, 2 002

PRESENT
Clerk:
chells
Prosecutor: WISSLER, SIRENA M.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BREEZE, ROBERT B.
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 13, 1959
Video
Tape Number:
9:58 am
CHARGES
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S (amended) - 3rd Degree
Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/14/2001 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO
DIST C/S a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison,
The prison term is suspended•
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Case No: 001919867
Date:
Feb 01, 2002
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$500.00
$0.00
$425.00
$925.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$500.00
$0
$425.00
$925.00
Plus Interest
Community service to be completed through Adult Probation & Parole.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
The imposition of sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed on
probation.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 925.00 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Violate no laws.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
SERVE 3 DAYS IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL WITH CREDIT FOR 3 DAYS
SERVED.
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Case No: 001919867
Date:
Feb 01, 2002
Random drug testing for the first 3 months at least 1 time per
week. Thereafter 1 time per month unless ordered differently.
Obtain and maintain full time work.
Not to associate with old friends that he used drugs with.
Prior consent of Court/APPD for perscriptions.
May be in a bar for the purpose of work and being paid.
Complete 200 hours of community service hours in lieu of further
jail.
Continue and finish Drug Free Community after care program.
Enter and complete the Domestic Violation program.
Attend AA/CA/NA 2 times per week.
To be given credit of $400.00 towards fine for payments made to
Drug Free Community.
Must complete the Domestic Violand and Drug Free programs.
At this time no restitution is ordered owed. The State to provide
within 30 days an amount if any owed.
A warrant is not needed for searches by APPD/Officer.
Mr Breeze does not need to be present at review. If therer is a
problem the review will be continued to a setting that Mr Breeze
can appear on.
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 04/26/2002
Time: 02:00 p.m,
Location: Fourth Floor - N44
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: LESLIE A. LEWIS
Dated this
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'LESElE A. LEWIS
District Court Judder; t>*'^X' A
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In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7058 at least three working days
prior to the proceeding. The general information phone number is
(801)238-7300.
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